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Abstract: This article examines Italy’s attempts to export the Fascist revolution to areas 
formally and informally controlled by Britain. The challenge mounted by the Italian 
government to the British imperial structure rested upon the development of preferential 
relations with nationalist movements throughout the empire; such relationship would be 
forged by propaganda in a region, the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, 
which was central to Mussolini’s foreign policy. The promotion of Fascist ideology among the 
Middle Eastern populations, and in particular in Egypt and Palestine, was driven by political 
priorities rather than ideological imperatives insofar as propaganda was carefully employed 
to expand the economic and military capacity of Fascist Italy. Thus propaganda became as 
early as the 1920s an instrument of foreign policy. This article also questions the effectiveness 
of Britain’s response to the Fascist challenge: here structural problems within the British 
propaganda machine and intelligence community seriously undermined Britain’s defence 
against Axis subversion in the Middle East. 
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«We admire with a feeling of sincere enthusiasm the head of Fascism for 
his humane comprehension, his sympathy towards Islam, and his courage 
for having dared to rise before anybody else against the myth of British 
might», an Arab chief claimed pointing to the photographs of Mussolini 
and Hitler displayed in a café near the Jaffa gate in Jerusalem.1 The Italian 
newspaper «Corriere della Sera» described Muslim celebrations of the 
Birthday of the Prophet led by the Mufti of Jerusalem and emphasised «the 
bitter rancour of the autochthonous population of the Holy Land against the 
Mandatory Power».2
                                                 
1 Drummond to Eden, May 28, 1937, U.K. National Archives, CO 733/341/15. 
 Two days earlier, another Italian newspaper, «La 
Stampa», had drawn attention to the prominent display of Italian and 
German flags together with Arab flags in Jerusalem; photographs of the 
2 Ibid. 
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Duce and the Führer were exhibited in the centre of town, whilst 
remarkable appeared the complete absence of British flags.3 The Italians 
took it as a clear sign of the bitter feelings of the Arab community of 
Palestine towards Britain, feelings that the Fascist regime was set to 
heighten through a vast and well-co-ordinated propaganda campaign that 
employed Italian and local media, bribery and personal contacts, members 
of the Italian community and diplomats. Italian propagandists carefully 
exploited the set of political, economic and social circumstances that had 
undermined British presence in Palestine; through the wavelengths of Radio 
Bari and from the pages of Italian and Arab newspapers they played upon 
the increasing tension between the Jewish and Arab communities and 
emphasised the inadequacy of the policy of equilibrium adopted by the 
British mandatory authorities and the excesses of British military response 
to Arab uprisings that had begun in 1936. The British appeared irritated by 
and anxious about Italian activities in Palestine and throughout the Middle 
East, although not greatly concerned about the long-term effects of Fascist 
propaganda; to many in Whitehall Italian endeavours seemed ephemeral 
and short-lived, especially once the Arabs had finally understood the 
imperialist nature of Mussolini’s foreign policy. As to the Italian 
newspapers, the British High Commissioner in Palestine remarked that in 
his articles the correspondent for both «La Stampa» and «Corriere della 
Sera», the Italian priest Dr. Mombelli, was «contributing to his utmost to 
the trend of Italian propaganda».4
     During the last twenty years, the study of propaganda in its historical 
and more contemporary manifestations has received considerable impetus. 
In particular, since the 1980s historians and social scientists have been 
engaged in a vast programme of scholarly research that has 
comprehensively explored the building of state propaganda machines in 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Exemplar of this trend is David 
Welch’s work on the Third Reich’s propaganda machine, strategies and 
techniques, and even more relevant to the subject of this article is Jeffrey 
Herf’s wide-ranging study of Nazi propaganda in the Arab and Muslim 
world during the Second World War.
 
5
                                                 
3 See ibid. 
 Notwithstanding the growing interest 
4 Wauchope to Ormsby Gore, 23 August 1937, U.K. National Archives, CO 733/341/15. 
5 See D. WELCH, ed., Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations, London, Croom 
Helm, 1983; ID., Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945, London, I.B. Tauris, 2001; 
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in the emergence of mass societies and the subsequent reconfiguration of 
the relationship between governments, media and public opinions during 
the interwar years, the contemporary experience of Fascist media and 
cultural propaganda has received comparatively little attention, despite the 
regime’s widespread use of techniques of mass persuasion. Seminal studies 
by Victoria De Grazia and Philip Cannistraro address broad questions 
concerning the creation of public consensus in Italy during the years of the 
Fascist regime, whilst volumes by W. Vincent Arnold and Luisa 
Quatermaine offer a thoughtful insight respectively into the work of the 
Fascist propaganda machine during the Second World War and the 
controversial activities of the reconstituted Ministry of Popular Culture 
under the Salo’ Republic.6 In Italy, research into the regime’s domestic 
propaganda apparatus, its use of the mass media and in particular its 
relationship with the press (especially during the Abyssinian war) have 
generated considerable interest, although until recently little work had been 
done to assess the overseas dimension of Fascist propaganda, let alone the 
powerful connection existing between propaganda, diplomacy and foreign 
policy. Typically, studies of Italian foreign policy have offered little insight 
into the role of propaganda within Mussolini’s expansionist agenda. In his 
multi-volume biography of Mussolini, Renzo De Felice briefly addresses 
the controversial relationship between Fascism and the Arab world, which, 
De Felice claims, began acquiring real significance from 1933.7 As the 
regime strove to rekindle the old ties with Italy’s Mediterranean neighbours 
and connect with Arab nationalist movements, Rome’s diplomatic efforts 
coupled with propaganda and increasing economic penetration, achieved 
«results that cannot be regarded as insignificant».8
                                                                                                       
ID., The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda, second edition, London, Routledge, 2002; J. 
HERF, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, Yale, Yale University Press, 2011. 
 More recently, in his 
volume Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, Robert Mallet 
briefly comments on the significance of Radio Bari broadcasts and their 
6 See V.W. ARNOLD, The Illusion of Victory: Fascist Propaganda and the Second World War, 
New York, Peter Lang, 1997; P. CANNISTRARO, La fabbrica del consenso, Bari, Laterza, 1975; 
V. DE GRAZIA, The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of Leisure in Fascist Italy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981; L. QUATERMAINE, Mussolini’s Last Republic: 
Propaganda and Politics in the Italian Social Republic R.S.I., 1943-45, Exeter, Elm Bank 
Publications, 2000. 
7 See R. DE FELICE, Mussolini il duce. I. Gli anni del consenso, 1929-1936, Torino, Einaudi, 
1974. 
8 Ibid., p. 655. 
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impact on deteriorating Anglo-Italian relations during the second half of the 
1930s.9 Amongst the most noteworthy contributions to the Italian 
historiography, Stefano Fabei’s study Il fascio, la svastica e la mezzaluna 
offers a detailed account of Axis strategy in the Arab world from the mid-
1930s to 1945, highlighting ideological similarities, co-operation and 
divergences between Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Arab nationalist 
forces.10
     Within the last decade, a renewed interest in Italy’s Mediterranean and 
Middle Eastern policies has given depth and breadth to scholarly research 
into Fascist Italy’s foreign affairs. This author’s volume Mussolini’s 
Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East, 1935-1940, which examines the interplay of politics, diplomacy and 
propaganda under the fascist regime, was followed by Nir Arielli’s Fascist 
Italy and the Middle East, 1933-40 and by Massimiliano Fiore’s 
monograph Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 1922-1940.
 
11
     This article examines the war of words waged by Rome and London to 
win the favour of Arab nationalist movements throughout the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, with special reference to Egypt and 
Palestine. The objectives of the programme of ‘internationalisation’ of the 
Fascist doctrine and promotion of the regime had become clear already in 
the late 1920s, but it was towards the end of the 1930s that the Fascist 
authorities increased the pace and heightened the tone of their overseas 
propaganda intended to link up with, and to harness, the volatile anti-
colonialist movements of the region. The outbreak of the Second World 
 These 
three studies focus on the period leading up to Italy’s entry into the war and 
examine successes and failures of Italy’s colonial and imperial policies with 
specific reference to the Middle East. Within a broader thematic 
framework, these volumes give emphasis to discrete aspects of Italy’s 
strategies in the region – cultural policies and propaganda (Williams), 
foreign and colonial policies (Arielli), diplomatic and military agreements 
(Fiore). 
                                                 
9 See R. MALLETT, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933-1940, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 120. 
10 See S. FABEI, Il fascio, la svastica e la mezzaluna, Milano, Mursia, 2002. 
11 See N. ARIELLI, Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 1933-40, London and New York, 
Palgrave, 2010; M. FIORE, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 1922-1940, Farnham, 
Ashgate, 2010; M. WILLIAMS, Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935-1940, London, Routledge, 2006.  
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War added a further dimension to Italian propaganda and subversion; 
however, notwithstanding the increased efforts of the Fascist regime, from 
1940 the popularity of Italian-sponsored information channels and cultural 
initiatives in the Arab world began a rapid descent. 
     With the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, expressions of sympathy and 
appreciation for Italy’s conduct in the Muslim world became increasingly 
rare. Even Galeazzo Ciano was aware of this change of sentiments. In 
February 1939, after receiving reports from Berlin that the Egyptian king 
Farouq was asking for Axis support should he proclaim Egypt’s neutrality 
in the event of a European war, Ciano remarked: «This matter is so serious 
that it makes me want to make a number of reservations, even though the 
source of information is very reliable».12
     Efforts to assess the effectiveness of propaganda campaigns in history 
have sometimes proved to be a frustrating endeavour. On a more superficial 
level it is possible to ascertain whether the objectives of the campaign have 
been achieved, but this often owes to the particular historical conjuncture 
and the interplay of various factors as much as the work of the 
propagandists themselves. In the absence of surveys and questionnaires, 
establishing a link of causality between propaganda and the response of its 
target audience remains methodologically problematic.
 Britain, however, failed to 
recognise the decline of Italy’s influence in the region and to retain the 
long-term loyalty and friendship of the Arab populations and national 
governments in the Middle East. As the war began, military and strategic 
requirements were given priority over cultural propaganda by British 
policy-makers, although the BBC strove to maintain the ties of sentiment 
between the metropole and the rest of the empire. But indigenous troops 
throughout the empire fought for the last time on Britain’s side; within few 
years, India would be granted independence whilst the withdrawal of 
British troops and administrators from mandatory Palestine would soon be 
followed by the creation of the state of Israel. 
13
                                                 
12 M. MUGGERIDGE, Ciano’s Diary, 1937-1943, London, Phoenix Press, 2002, p. 193. 
 The case of Italy 
is particularly indicative: here, Fascist propagandists, unlike their German 
colleagues, displayed little interest in systematically gauging popular 
response to their campaigns. The ensuing lack of formal feedback to the 
13 Methodological and theoretical issues related to the assessment of the effectiveness of 
individual propaganda strategies and campaigns are addressed in J. ELLUL, Propaganda: The 
Formation of Men’s Attitudes, New York, Vintage Books, 1973; G.S. JOWETT – V. 
O’DONNELL, Propaganda and Persuasion, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 1999.  
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broadcast of Radio Bari, for example, hinders our understanding of the 
reaction of Arab audiences to Italian propaganda; participation of Egyptian, 
Syrian and Palestinian students to educational exchange programmes were 
seldom and haphazardly recorded, but never examined; the opinions of 
members of nationalist organisations and parties and their perceptions of 
Italy’s domestic and foreign policies were rarely canvassed. Thus, any 
attempt to measure the effectiveness of Fascist propaganda in the Middle 
East and North Africa rests primarily on claims and counter-claims made 
by Italian and British diplomats in the region, who witnessed the unfolding 
of the Fascist campaign during times of high international tension. 
Contradicting accounts are offered by both sides; distinguishing between 
the real achievements of Italian propagandists and the effects of Britain’s 
mishandling of her relations with the Arab world, becomes here a true 
challenge.  
     The organisation of the propaganda machine and the interaction of all its 
components are at the core of any research into activities designed to 
influence individual and collective perceptions and attitudes. In the 1920s, 
the Fascist regime attempted to establish its presence in the international 
arena by targeting primarily the numerous Italian communities overseas. 
The fascistizzazione of Italian society went hand in hand with the process of 
expansion of Italian culture abroad and the gradual centralisation of Italian 
diplomatic and cultural institutions such as the Direzione Generale delle 
Scuole Italiane all’Estero and the Fasci all’Estero, which were brought 
under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.14 In 1927, new 
reforms were introduced to tie Italian nationals living overseas to the 
metropole, which led to the creation of the Direzione Generale degli Italiani 
all’Estero and of the Comitato per l’Espansione della Cultura all’Estero; 
however, the vigorous drive towards the rapid fascistizzazione and 
ideological mobilisation of Italians abroad carried the risk of sowing 
division within the Italian communities and alienate them from the political 
and social environment in which they had until then prospered.15
                                                 
14 See B. GARZARELLI, “Parleremo al mondo intero”. La propaganda del fascismo all’estero, 
Alessandria, Edizioni dell’Orso, 2004, p. 15. 
 At the 
heart of the cultural, political and economic expansion of Fascist Italy was 
the Società Nazionale Dante Alighieri, established in Rome in 1899 to 
disseminate the Italian language and culture overseas. Throughout the 
15 See E. SERRA, La burocrazia della politica estera italiana, in R.J.B. BOSWORTH – S. 
ROMANO, La politica estera italiana, 1860-1985, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1991, p. 83. 
Mussolini's War of Words:Italian Propaganda and Subversion in Egypt and Palestine, 
1934-1939 
55 
1920s the Dante Alighieri society was gradually incorporated into the 
propaganda machine of the regime, although it would be fair to say that 
despite the initial resistance of the Dante Alighieri, the relationship between 
the society and the government was based on collaboration and common 
nationalist ideals; such strong nationalist component furthered «the rapid 
identification of the objectives of the society itself with those of the 
regime».16
     In the 1930s, the organisation of propaganda overseas received new 
impetus as the regime became increasingly keen to proclaim the 
international and universal nature of Fascism. The process of expansion of 
Italian propaganda overseas, which would no longer target Italian nationals 
but engage foreign audiences in a bid to overturn prejudices and stereotypes 
that had marred perceptions and understanding of the Fascist regime, was 
mainly driven by Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1932, Mussolini 
took over the interim direction of the Ministry and reformed its structure: as 
a result, five distinct sections emerged based on a subject-area division: 
Political Affairs – that since the 1887 Pisani-Dossi reform had retained 
clear primacy – Economic Affairs, Treaties and Private Affairs, Personnel, 
Italians Abroad and Schools.
  
17
                                                 
16 S. SANTORO, L’Italia e l’Europa orientale. Diplomazia culturale e propaganda 1918-1943, 
Milano, Franco Angeli, 2005, p. 54. 
 The centralization of Italian propaganda and 
cultural diplomacy was supported by La Farnesina (the Italian Foreign 
Ministry) and culminated with the creation of an office for overseas 
propaganda, under the aegis of the Press Office of the Head of the 
Government, led since 1933 by Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s son-in-law. 
The propaganda apparatus that began to emerge in 1934 was the brainchild 
of Ciano, who had been inspired by the establishment of the German 
Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda in March 1933. The 
newly created overseas propaganda section was initially located within the 
building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with which it kept close 
relations over time. The strong interdependence between foreign policy and 
overseas propaganda was also emphasised by the presence of Galeazzo 
Ciano head first of the Ministry of Press and Propaganda (established in 
1935 and renamed Ministry of Popular Culture in 1937) and then of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
17 See M. ZUCCONI, Italy, in B. HOCKING – D. SPENCE, eds., Foreign Ministries in the 
European Union: Integrating Diplomats, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2005, pp. 164-165. 
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     The strategies adopted by Italian propagandists overseas aimed to 
provide the most suitable response to local socio-political conditions, and 
mostly rested on the existing consular and community structures. The 
activities of the Italian communities overseas have been the subject of 
recent historical research. In particular, the role of Italian immigrants to the 
United States and the extent to which they were actively promoting Fascist 
policies, culture and values, have received considerable attention. Efforts 
were made to accelerate the process of fascistizzazione of the Italian 
immigrants and the second generation of Italo-Americans. The Fascist 
regime engineered the systematic penetration of the numerous cultural and 
leisure organisations of the Italian community: the Ordine Figli d’Italia, 
Società Nazionale Dante Alighieri, the Italian Library of Information in 
New York, the Italy-America Society, the Italian Historical Society, the 
Casa Italiana at Columbia University among the most renowned. 
Membership of community institutions was particularly high among the so-
called prominenti, a class of successful Italo-American professionals and 
businessmen that became one of the most important and effective conduits 
of Fascist propaganda, although once Mussolini fell out of favour in 
America, the prominenti did not hesitate to denounce Fascism as quickly as 
they had embraced it.18 Cannistraro highlights the importance of the 
immigrant communities «as points of leverage and reference for Italian 
interests abroad – that is, an Italy lobby in foreign countries».19 
Establishing a modus operandi that would be perfected in the Middle East, 
from the late 1920s Italian propagandists weaved a network that rested on 
cultural institutions as well as some Catholic parishes and that was 
dedicated to the promotion of Fascist ideals among Italian immigrants; the 
outcome was what Italian historian Gaetano Salvemini termed as a «Fascist 
transmission belt».20
                                                 
18 See M. ABBATE, a cura di, L’Italia fascista tra Europa e Stati Uniti d’America, Civita 
Castellana e Orte, Centro Falisco di Studi Storici, 2003. 
 Propaganda activities would be ultimately co-
ordinated by Italian consular offices, and in particular by the local cultural 
agent. Italy would thus attempt to influence international perceptions and 
affairs through soft power as well as diplomatic manoeuvring and military 
agreements. 
19 P. CANNISTRARO, Blackshirts in Little Italy: Italian Americans and Fascism, 1921-1929, 
WestLafayette, Bordighera Press, 1999, p. 6. 
20 As quoted in S. LUCONI – G. TINTORI, L’ombra lunga del fascio. Canali di propagazione 
fascista per gli italiani d’America, Milano, M&B Publishing, 2004, p. 19. 
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     The Italian communities overseas were particularly keen to promote the 
image of a triumphant Italy. For example, in August 1935, when Ciano 
arrived in Port Said, British sources reported that approximately 3,000 
Fascists travelled from all over the country to the town. A crowd of 20,000 
people, including those resident in the area, invaded Port Said: «Those who 
travelled by car scattered coloured leaflets bearing fascist slogans in the 
streets. Some were in uniforms [...]. They were noisy and aggressive [...]. 
The demonstration has not done any good to Italian name. The overbearing 
behaviour of the Fascist contingents has disgusted local people».21
     In Egypt Italian nationals appeared particularly proactive and 
vociferous; Italian diplomats and intelligence agents and their Egyptian 
contacts relied on the infrastructures and support of a broad Italian 
community settled in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said. Italian communities 
in Egypt had enjoyed a degree of prosperity and amicable relations with 
their Muslim neighbours at least until the Abyssinian crisis, when suspicion 
and resentment towards Italy’s aggression rapidly spread among the 
Egyptian population. The size and internal structure of the Italian 
community in Egypt offered a solid base of support to the regime’s 
propagandists. Italian census data revealed that in 1936 18,548 Italians 
lived in Alexandria, some 17,300 in Cairo and around 600 in Port Said. 
Community life was centred upon a number of cultural, political and 
recreational associations such as the Fascio, the Società Nazionale Dante 
Alighieri, the Circolo Italiano Dopolavoro and the Associazione Nazionale 
Combattenti, all controlled by the government in Rome.
 
22 These 
organisations – whose members often operated behind the scenes on behalf 
of the Italian authorities – did not always appear directly involved in 
promoting Fascist political propaganda or other activities designed to 
undermine the internal stability of Egypt and the relations between the 
Egyptian government and its British counterpart.23
                                                 
21 Memorandum, August 29, 1935, U.K. National Archives, FO 371/19075/J4865/110/16. 
 The Italian authorities 
appeared extremely proud of the status and achievements of Italian 
residents in Egypt. At the end of 1936, The Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs – assessing the activities of Italian nationals in the upper Nile valley 
– claimed that the «solid, close and patriotic Italian community in Egypt 
22  See Egitto. Situazione politica nel 1936, undated, U.K. National Archives, GFM 36/505. 
23 See Lampson to Halifax, March 29, 1938, U.K. National Archives, FO 
371/21980/J1478/38/16. 
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was still providing an outstanding example of the achievements of Italian 
citizens abroad under the direction of the [Fascist] regime».24 The social 
profile of the Italian population of Egypt was rather diversified, including 
skilled workers, clerks, professionals and entrepreneurs. Some had achieved 
positions of responsibility within the structures controlled by the Fascist 
government, others had attempted to enter the high circles of the Egyptian 
political establishment. A small influx of Italian doctors and foreign doctors 
holding an Italian degree into the Sudan began in 1934, raising concerns 
that foreign professionals could be used by the Italian authorities to 
penetrate social and political circles in the Anglo-Egyptian condominium.25
 
 
Italy and the Middle East in the 1920s and 1930s 
 
The history of Italian propaganda activities in the Middle East dates back to 
the end of the First World War. In the aftermath of the war, the newly born 
Fascist movement seemed to sympathise with the nationalistic aspirations 
of the Middle Eastern peoples with which it shared suspicion and 
resentment towards the British and French colonial systems. The Fascist 
leadership established close relations with Arab nationalists whose 
initiatives were soon championed and amplified by the Italian press, 
generating among British officials fear of a possible collusion between Italy 
and the Islamic activists.  
     In the late 1920s, having consolidated his power Mussolini appeared 
prepared to undertake a more active role in the international arena and 
sought to build and consolidate an empire, occupying those few territories 
in North and East Africa that still remained independent. Central to the 
Fascist ideology and political programme was the notion of empire initially 
conceived as economic and “spiritual” expansion of the proletarian nation. 
Towards the end of the 1920s the imperial vocation led the regime to 
become engaged in the Balkans and in Africa aiming eventually to assert 
Italian hegemony in the Mediterranean and secure access to the Oceans.26
                                                 
24 Egitto. Situazione politica nel 1936, cit. 
 
Italian foreign-policy makers soon realised that to achieve a position of 
power in the mare nostrum, Italy had to seek an alliance with forces that 
25 See The Secretariat in Khartoum to the Chancery, Cairo, March 22, 1938, U.K. National 
Archives, FO 371/21996/65895. 
26 See E. GENTILE, Fascismo. Storia e interpretazione, Bari, Laterza, 2002, p. 29. 
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could challenge the British imperial and mandatory system from within. 
The most interesting aspect of Italy’s complex Middle Eastern policy was 
the unlikely partnership between an aspiring colonial power and an anti-
colonial movement. In other words, anti-colonialism became in the hands 
of the regime a tool for colonial expansion. In order to further its political 
and economic interests in the Middle East and Levant, Italy needed to 
ensure the friendship and compliance of the Arab nationalists, who in turn 
would gain the protection of Mussolini’s government, the necessary 
diplomatic and political leverage, and financial and military support, to 
force British and French colonial administrators to withdraw from the 
region. In Syria, for example, the nationalist Misak Party was keen to reach 
an understanding with the Fascist regime, which would lead to the 
recognition of an independent Syrian state under a constitutional monarchy, 
while the Italian government would provide for the security of the Syrian 
coastline.27
     The alliance between Fascist Italy and Arab leaders would be forged by 
propaganda. The main task awaiting Italian propagandists was to erase the 
violent colonial record of Italy in North Africa and Ethiopia, and to 
promote the image of Mussolini as the champion of modern Islam. 
However, the response generated by Italian propaganda in the Arab world 
did not necessarily match the objectives of Fascist foreign policy makers. 
Suspicion towards the real aims of Mussolini’s policy in the Middle East 
and resentment at his colonial undertaking in Africa remained widespread, 
eventually leaving the success of Italian propaganda confined to limited 
factions of the nationalist movement. 
 
     The initial thrust consisted mainly of cultural propaganda aimed at 
strengthening Italian ties with the Arab peoples «by praising Italy and the 
Fascist system».28
                                                 
27 See De Cicco a Mussolini, 13 giugno 1929, in I documenti diplomatici italiani (hereafter 
DDI), Settima serie, Vol. VII, pp. 476-478. 
 The Italian government organised a number of 
initiatives, along with the sponsorship of Arab press, distribution of Italian 
publications, the foundation of schools and hospitals, the creation of a news 
agency in Cairo and the institution of Radio Bari, which began to broadcast 
programmes of music and news in Arabic in March 1934. The aim was 
originally to restore Italian prestige after the Senussi massacre and the 
dramatic events in Libya, but the outbreak of hostilities in Abyssinia 
28 C.A. MACDONALD, Radio Bari: Italian Wireless Propaganda in the Middle East and British 
Countermeasures 1934-38, in «Middle Eastern Studies», XIII, 2, 1977, p. 195. 
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produced a sudden change in the propaganda campaign orchestrated by the 
government in Rome. Attacks on British policy in the Middle East became 
more frequent and direct; attempting to encourage Arab unrest in a region 
where Britain’s presence was strongly resented, the Italians were hoping to 
keep British troops engaged in security duties and therefore prevent them 
from intervening in the Ethiopian war.  
     Italian cultural propaganda in the Middle East and North Africa 
dramatically increased in the early 1930s, and targeted mainly students and 
the Arab nationalist intelligentsia. The considerable variety of publications 
sent directly from the Ministry of Popular Culture to Italian embassies, 
consulates and representatives abroad was instrumental in promoting the 
messages of the Fascist regime. The production of a wide range of books, 
journals and periodicals increased noticeably with the outbreak of hostilities 
in East Africa and was primarily designed to praise the achievements of the 
Fascist regime and emphasise Italian role in the international, and more 
specifically Middle Eastern, political arena. Academic and cultural 
institutions also opened to a larger Arab membership, Italian schools 
organised trips to Italy for Arab students, while the Italian government 
encouraged and promoted the creation of a Confederation of Oriental 
Students in Europe based in Rome. The Confederation was launched in 
December 1933 with great pomp in Rome, where 600 Asian students 
(including a large Egyptian contingent) were hosted by the Gruppi 
Universitari Fascisti. Mussolini’s speech was delivered in Italian and 
English then translated into French and German. The Duce reminded his 
audience that under the auspices of the Roman empire East met West, and 
the emerging union of cultures became central to the development of 
Western civilisation. Such fusion of Eastern and Western values was kept 
alive by the Fascist regime and would acquire renewed importance during 
times of political and social instability: «Today Rome and the 
Mediterranean, with the Fascist spiritual rebirth, are reclaiming their 
“unifying mission”».29
                                                 
29 Convegno degli studenti asiatici a Roma e discorso di S.E. Mussolini, in «Oriente 
Moderno», XIII, 1933, p. 19. 
 However, Mussolini’s attempts to win Arab support 
were not always successful: Italian manoeuvres were still regarded with 
suspicion in some Arab circles such as the Arab Youth Committee of 
Geneva, which boycotted the rally organised in Rome by the Oriental 
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Students in 1933 and denounced it as «an instrument of Italian 
imperialism».30
     Cultural and educational exchanges had always been regarded as a key 
area for the activities of Italian propagandists. This was acknowledged by 
British officials in the Middle East who had urged the government in 
London to co-operate with its regional counterparts in order to establish 
regular exchange programmes for parties of teachers and students who 
wished to visit the United Kingdom during the summer vacation. The 
Italians had successfully and ruthlessly exploited their connections with 
education institutions in Egypt and Palestine providing special discounts for 
parties interested in visiting Italy; for example, the equivalent of £10 per 
person would cover a return ticket from Palestine as well as two to three 
weeks staying in Italy. Undoubtedly, the Italian government’s long-
standing ability to manipulate education and leisure for propaganda 
purposes proved to be invaluable. In 1939, the British Foreign Office 
expressed anxiety about the inroads made by Italian and German agents 
into Egyptian schools and universities, where young people had been 
offered free travelling to Italy and Germany in order to study and 
understand the Fascist and Nazi movements and their achievements; British 
officials anticipated that many of the young Egyptians might return home 
«ardent admirers of the totalitarian states […] and would thereafter act as 
German and Italian propaganda agents».
 
31
 
 On the eve of the outbreak of the 
conflict in Europe, the Foreign Office appeared uncertain about the 
friendship of the Egyptian people and fearful of losing control of an area 
that was vital for the defence of the empire.  
Palestine 
 
Although the geopolitical map of Italian propaganda activities covers a vast 
area, from South America to South East Asia, the examination of Egypt and 
Palestine offers a clear insight into patterns of propaganda and strategies of 
information adopted by the Fascist regime. Throughout the 1930s, as the 
Arab-Jewish dispute over Palestinian land grew in intensity, the Italian 
government adopted a distinct position in support of Arab claims. The 
                                                 
30 R.L. MELKA, The Axis and the Middle East: 1930-1945, Ph.D. Dissertation, The University 
of Minnesota, 1966, p. 16. 
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directions of Italian policy in Palestine were not based on racial anti-
Semitic prejudices, but on political and strategic considerations: in the eyes 
of the Italians, a powerful and independent Jewish community in Palestine, 
and eventually a Jewish state, would provide a solid and permanent base for 
Britain in the Mediterranean. Italian endorsement of the Arab cause became 
even more explicit as a clear division of camps gradually emerged both in 
Europe and in the Middle East. Thus Italian propaganda bluntly presented 
the Axis coalition as the saviour of the Arab world.  
     Despite Italian outright support of Arab nationalist demands, Italy’s 
prestige in the Arab world had been seriously undermined by the war in 
Abyssinia. Italian officials complained that the Palestinian press had 
expressed strong disapproval of Italian policies in East Africa. However, 
officials in Rome were quite certain that, after their initial rejection of 
Italy’s military campaign in Abyssinia, Palestinian Arab nationalists would 
come to realise that an alliance with the Fascist regime offered them the 
best prospects of future independence. All this was cause for concern in 
London, where British Foreign Office and intelligence officials believed 
that Italian activities in the Middle East – of which they claimed to have 
seen substantial evidence – were also part of Mussolini’s war plans, 
intended to keep Britain ‘fully occupied in her Mandated Territories’ during 
the hostilities.32
     Looking at Palestine in the critical years 1935 and 1936, it is possible to 
observe that the operational pattern adopted to conduct propaganda in that 
area rather differed from the one that had characterised Italian activities in 
Egypt. This seems to reflect a Palestinian social and political environment 
that was crucially distinct from the Egyptian, and in which Italian agents 
had to deal with markedly different circumstances and actors. First of all, 
the existence of a British mandatory government removed the opportunity 
for Italy to find precious allies and sympathisers in the higher or middle 
spheres of the administration. Second, political interactions in Palestine 
were rather complex and fraught, based on the development of competing 
interests of the Arab and Jewish communities, and on the ‘policy of 
equilibrium’ adopted by the British mandatory authorities. Having already 
presented Italy as the champion of the Arab people, Mussolini – despite a 
brief flirtation with the Zionist Revisionist forces – lent his support to the 
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demands of the Palestinian Arab community against the much resented 
mandatory government, and an even more despised community of Jewish 
newcomers, seen as the guarantor of British perpetual presence in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East.  
     Like in Egypt, the Italian community appeared broadly cohesive and 
proactive; many Italian firms, and in particular engineering firms, were 
directly subsidised by the government in Rome; managers and employees 
of companies of international reputation, such as insurance brokers Lloyd 
Triestino and the Banco di Roma, seemed «unceasing in their efforts to 
disseminate Italian and Fascist propaganda».33 However, the main vehicle 
of Italian propaganda against British policy in Palestine was information, 
distorted information according to British sources, disseminated not only 
through press and radio broadcasts, but also books, pamphlets, leaflets, 
cartoons, and all types of visual and verbal communications. Pamphlets like 
Ce que fait l’Italie pour l’Islam et l’Afrique, outlining in the text and 
emphasising with images that Italy cared about the moral and physical 
welfare of the Muslim populations by building schools, mosques, hospitals, 
community centres in its African colonies.34 Or more gruesome 
publications like What the League of Nations does not want to see 
containing pictures illustrating atrocities allegedly committed by 
Abyssinians against Italians and their supporters.35 More pamphlets found 
their ways into Arab households in countries like Egypt, where young 
Fascist men began to distribute propaganda material in French and Arabic, 
such as Abyssinia and Slavery, which depicted atrocities and violations 
committed by the Abyssinians not only against the Italians, but also against 
local Muslim communities.36 Four Palestinian newspapers were also 
believed to be the recipient of funding from Italian agents; among them, 
«Al jami’a Al Islamiya» was regarded as the most open to Italian bribe and 
inclined to amplify the messages of Fascist propagandists.37
                                                 
33 Wauchope to Parkinson, October 16, 1936, U.K. National Archives, CO 733/299/12. 
 
34 See Pamphlet: Ce que fait l’Italie pour l’Islam et l’Afrique, 1936, U.K. National Archives, 
CO 733/299/12. 
35 See Palestine Police Summary, February 18, 1936, U.K. National Archives, FO 
371/20018/E1293/19/31. On Italian publications distributed in Palestine, see also Report from 
the CID in Jerusalem, 19 February 1936, U.K. National Archives, CO 733/299/12.  
36 See Pamphlet: Abyssinia and Slavery, October 1935, U.K. National Archives, FO 
141/659/994/69/35.  
37 See Hall to Thomas, February 29, 1936, U.K. National Archives, CO 733/299/12. 
Manuela Williams 
64 
     Information was the most effective medium used by the Italian 
government and its agents for propaganda purposes. Information through 
press and other printed publications, however, had a limited target of 
recipients, an elite who was not only literate but also highly educated. 
Large sections of the Arab populations, particularly in Egypt and Palestine, 
would have remained oblivious of the message of Italian propagandists if in 
the 1930s radio broadcasts had not become one of the main instruments of 
domestic and international propaganda. The key to the success of radio 
broadcasts was simple: the radio relied upon spoken words leading to a 
more personal and direct approach compared to that of other media; it was 
capable of reaching the masses, regardless of their geographical location, 
social status, education or ideological affiliations; and finally, lacking 
adequate jamming devices, radio transmissions were extremely difficult to 
silence. 
     The success of Radio Bari with its broadcasts in Arabic was not 
overlooked by the British government of Palestine. In November 1935, 
British officials estimated that over 10,000 licences had already been issued 
in Palestine, where Bari broadcasts had become increasingly popular in 
Arab cafes. Radio Bari was created in 1934 by Galeazzo Ciano, at that time 
director of the Under-secretariat for Press and Propaganda. Initially, Arab 
programmes were broadcast three times per week and reached the Italian 
colony of Libya as well as the French and British territories of Morocco, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine and part of the Red Sea region. They consisted 
mainly of Arab music, a favourite among listeners, news, likely to reach a 
wider audience in an area of high illiteracy, and finally talk shows.38
     Interestingly, the broadcasts in Arabic appeared to be very discreet about 
the Italian empire, often leaving out of the bulletin news coming from 
Somalia, Ethiopia or other regions where Italian policies could be opened to 
 
Already during the summer of 1935, Radio Bari was broadcasting every 
day and had expanded the length of its well-received programmes. By the 
end of 1935, Radio Bari broadcasts were becoming increasingly popular, 
especially in Arab cafes. Arab broadcast news contained a section dedicated 
to international events, mainly related to Italy and, after the creation of the 
Axis, to its allies Germany and Japan.  
                                                 
38 The language used during the first news broadcasts was classical Arabic, which was 
understood only by a minority of educated listeners. Fearing a sharp decline in audience, Radio 
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criticism. Reports of events in the Middle East were considered interesting 
as long as they underlined the contrast between the positive role played by 
Italy and the repressive measures adopted by Britain and France. As a 
result, «areas such as Egypt, Palestine, where the relationship between 
Western Democracies and Arabs was strained, were the ones that hit the 
headlines».39
     To promote Italy’s diplomatic endeavours and the values and ideology 
of the regime, Italian propagandists also relied on personal contacts. 
Among them, most prominently features the Syrian nationalist writer Emir 
Shakib Arslan who in the 1930s began promoting an alliance between Italy 
and nationalist forces in Syria and Palestine, and his friend and collaborator 
Ihsan al-Jabiri, as well as Haj Amin al-Hussaini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, 
who in the 1930s gradually shifted towards more amicable relations with 
the Axis powers.
 
40 In 1934 al-Jabiri and the Mufti were believed to have 
distributed 30,000 Italian lira to Scout groups and Nazi and Fascist 
organisations in Palestine.41
                                                 
39 D.J. GRANGE, Structure et technique d’une propagande: Les émissions arabes de Radio 
Bari, in «Relationes Internationales», 2, 1974, p. 171. 
 Italian propaganda in Palestine kept its 
momentum for a few years, exploiting the situation of political and social 
unrest that was undermining Britain’s presence in its own mandate, in 
particular at the outbreak of the Arab rebellion of 1936. Eventually, the 
pressure brought by the intensifying Fascist campaign in the Middle East 
and the Levant forced the Italians and the British to look for a settlement 
over the major object of their contention: the Mediterranean sea. The 
Gentlemen’s Agreement of January 1937 was a first step in this direction. 
Furthermore, in April 1938, after long on and off negotiations, Rome and 
London signed the Easter Agreement in which both parties agreed that any 
form of hostile propaganda would be «inconsistent with the good relations 
40 Despite taking a clear pro-Axis stance in the late 1930s, throughout the decade the Mufti 
was rather weary of making his political allegiances publicly known. Some British officials in 
Palestine came to the conclusion that he was not Italophile: «He is however sitting on the fence 
and it is of course quite possible that he might in certain circumstances be persuaded to make 
use of Italian money or of international complication to further Arab Nationalist aims and his 
own ambition». Telegram from the Officer Administrating the Government in Palestine to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, September 12, 1935, U.K. National Archives, FO 
371/18925/E5595/5595/65. 
41 See Moody to Williams, March 18,  1937, U.K. National Archives, CO 733/341/15. 
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which is the object of the present agreement».42 Italy’s subversive activities 
in Palestine seemed to have waned as a result of the agreed settlement. 
Broadcasts from Radio Bari were reported to have softened their tone, 
although part of the local press – backed by Rome - still maintained a fairly 
violent opposition to the mandatory government.43
 
 By the end of 1940, 
Italian activities in Palestine were not as preponderant as they had been: 
Italy had broadened the scope of its overseas propaganda and was 
simultaneously engaged in various geographical areas. Italian embassies in 
Portugal, South America, Iran, in the Indian subcontinent and the Far East 
were by then providing the logistic support for Italy’s promotional 
activities. 
Egypt 
 
During the interwar years Egyptian politics critically shifted from 
traditional – moderate and West-friendly – values to the adoption of more 
militant and pan-Arabic models, which gradually re-shaped Egyptian 
national identity and brought Egypt right to the heart of the Arab world. 
The escalating tension between nationalist forces and British 
representatives together with the emergence of a pan-Arab orientation 
within the nationalist movement created favourable conditions for the 
Italian government to promote a closer alliance with some Egyptian 
political and intellectual circles. During the interwar years, and in particular 
in the late 1930s and early 1940s, Egyptian national consciousness moved 
from values based on a glorious pharaonic past to the adoption of a shared 
Arab and Islamic identity. The Arabisation and Islamisation of Egyptian 
national identity had profound repercussions on Egyptian society and 
politics and offered new opportunities to Italian propagandists: nationalist 
forces began to look up to the Axis regimes and borrow their ideological 
blueprint, as well as political and cultural models. 
     Italian agents like the journalist Ugo Dadone were instrumental in 
establishing contacts with radical nationalists. In June 1935, the Agenzia di 
Egitto e Oriente (AEO) was created; on the surface, this was a news agency 
but behind the scenes the AEO provided local support to the propaganda 
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activities of the Italian government. In particular, it was tasked with 
developing close relations with the Arab press by offering financial backing 
to Egyptian newspapers and by bribing journalists.44 The Agenzia had its 
headquarters in Cairo and was placed by Galeazzo Ciano under the 
direction of Ugo Dadone, previously editor of the «Giornale d’Oriente». 
Dadone’s directorship of the AEO lasted until 1938 when, as Italy started 
reorganising and scaling down some of its operations in Egypt, the Agenzia 
was closed and its functions absorbed by the local branch of the Agenzia 
Stefani, the official news agency of the Fascist regime. Dadone left for 
Rome and then Germany, where he would conceivably ease the transfer of 
propaganda initiatives in the Middle East from the Italians to the Germans, 
at a time when the Third Reich, initially reluctant to challenge Britain’s 
presence in the region, had opted for heavier involvement in Arab politics. 
Dadone’s importance within the Fascist overseas propaganda machine was 
not downplayed by British officials: «Signor Dadone would, with all the 
information he has been able to collect in the Near East, no doubt be 
regarded at Italian headquarters in Rome as an expert of anti-British 
propaganda».45
     Dadone and his collaborators scoured the political landscape of Egypt in 
search of support from the more vociferous and militant quarters. Among 
the youth nationalist organisations approached the Young Egypt movement, 
for example, was asked to lend its voice to an anti-British campaign during 
the Abyssinian crisis. In order to ‘inflame Egyptian public opinion as much 
as possible against Great Britain’, the Italian consular authorities suggested 
that the main points of the propaganda campaign should be: a) Egyptian 
application for membership of the League of Nations; b) the restoration of 
Egyptian rights in Sudan; c) the abolition of the Capitulations; and finally 
the recognition of Egyptian right to protect the Suez Canal.
   
46
                                                 
44 See FABEI, Il fascio, la svastica e la mezzaluna, cit., p. 42. 
 The effects of 
Italian manoeuvres soon became visible. Attracted to Fascist anti-
parliamentarian ideas and to the financial support promised by the Italian 
government, the Young Egypt society gave its contribution to the pro-
Italian and anti-British campaign orchestrated in Rome. For example, 
ignoring the wave of indignation that had swept over Egyptian public 
45 Lampson to Halifax, December 9, 1938, U.K. National Archives, FO 371/21982/65895/ 
J4655. 
46 See ibid.  
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opinion after the invasion of Abyssinia, at the end of October 1935 
members of the Young Egypt movement sent a petition to King Fuad, 
demanding that Egypt should remain neutral towards the Abyssinian 
dispute. However, it should be remembered that Young Egypt was by no 
means representative of the views of mainstream nationalists. Recent 
scholarly research into 1930s Egypt, has successfully demonstrated that 
Egyptian public opinion was by and large unreceptive to the allures of the 
European revisionist powers and the ideological and political constructs of 
fascism and totalitarianism.47
     Italian propaganda in Egypt gathered momentum following the 
increasing tension in East Africa. The Italians, concerned by the mounting 
hostility expressed by most Egyptian press, began to explore more affective 
ways to increase the profile of Fascist Italy to the detriment of Britain’s 
influence in the upper Nile region. Galeazzo Ciano took direct interest on 
the matter and suggested that existing publicity outlets, and mainly press 
activities, should be strengthened. In particular he proposed the creation of 
a news bulletin under the aegis of the Italian Legation in Cairo, which in 
form and contents ‘would meet the special demands of public opinion in 
Egypt’.
 
48 The new organ would make use of material provided by the 
Italian publication «Giornale d’Oriente» and by intercepts supplied to a 
wireless receiving set «to be installed in a suitable place with due 
secrecy».49
     The means employed by the Italian government to open new channels of 
communications with broader sectors of Egyptian society as well as the 
Palace and parliament were very varied. Attempting to engage in a dialogue 
 Overall, supported by a well-connected network of agents – and 
the role of Italian secret services in North Africa deserves special treatment 
– co-ordinated by the Italian Consular offices and relying on the 
infrastructures of the Italian community in Egypt, Fascist propaganda 
carefully attempted to exploit domestic political feuds and nationalist 
sentiments emerging among Egyptian political and intellectual forces. 
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with the Egyptian educated urban class, the Italians began to implement an 
educational programme that would expose Egyptian students to the history 
and culture of Fascist Italy. Starting from primary education, the Italian 
authorities were offering a wide range of incentives to pupils interested in 
Italian history and culture. The two Italian elementary schools in Cairo, for 
example, provided special subsidies and support to children coming from 
non affluent backgrounds: shoes in winter, sandals in summer, aprons, 
books and stationery, together with free meals, were given to poor children 
to encourage them to register with schools run by Italian authorities. In the 
only Italian secondary school in Cairo, all subjects – mainly vocational or 
art-related – were taught in Italian, while books on Italian history and 
literature were distributed as a reward to the most deserving students. 
Following strict Fascist traditions, every morning pupils entering the school 
had to greet the Head Teacher with the Fascist salute.50 Egyptian 
universities were also targeted by the Italian propaganda machine. Italian 
staff at the Faculty of Arts of the Egyptian University in Cairo liaised 
directly with Italian Ministries in Rome, and actively promoted cultural 
exchanges by providing financial support to Egyptian students who wished 
to undertake short-term courses at Italian universities.51
     Anglo-Egyptian relations deteriorated in the winter of 1935 and through 
1936, when unresolved constitutional issues created a state of tension in 
urban areas between the Palace and middle class youth. This opened new 
opportunities to Italian propagandists like the Colonial Attaché of the 
Italian Legation, Patrizi, who in the autumn and winter of 1935 frantically 
worked to document public demonstrations, fuel resentment and prove that 
Britain was to blame for the state of unrest in Egypt. The British 
government laboured to provide an adequate response to Italian propaganda 
and subversion. Fuelled by the events in East Africa, relations between 
Rome and London reached a critical stage. British representatives in Egypt 
called for a more coherent and decisive line of action, which needed 
integrating into an overarching counter-propaganda and counter-
intelligence strategy.  Italian activities in Egypt continued undisturbed until 
1937, when the Gentlemen’s Agreement between Rome and London 
softened the tone and intensity of Fascist propaganda; however, the British 
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government proved to be somewhat slow in co-ordinating its cultural and 
information policies designed to mend the broken relations with its 
Egyptian counterpart and with the leadership of the nationalist movement. 
This set the trend for the interaction between British, Italians and nationalist 
forces in Egypt right until the outbreak of the Second World War, when 
Egyptian and Arab forces fought for the last times to defend Britain and the 
empire. 
 
Britain 
 
In 1934, as Radio Bari began its vehement anti-British broadcasts in 
Arabic, British officials in the metropole were still debating about the moral 
and ultimately financial justification for promoting Britain’s interests 
overseas through cultural initiatives and political propaganda, which had by 
then fallen into disfavour among the British public and politicians. The 
excesses of atrocity campaigns during the First World War, when 
nevertheless the British set the standard in modern propaganda, created an 
environment in which propaganda was denounced as violation of the core 
values underpinning democratic systems. During the interwar years, British 
politicians and public opinion shared with their American cousins the fear 
that propaganda, one of the most powerful and subtle instruments used by 
governments to persuade domestic and foreign audiences, might turn 
«human beings into an amalgamated mass of hate and will and hope».52
     Despite numerous changes to Britain’s propaganda and communication 
strategy brought about by the intensification of the aggressive campaign 
organised by the Italian government, and the worsening of Britain’s 
relations with Arab nationalist leadership, the steps undertaken in London 
seemed insufficient to counter Axis offensive and to restore Britain’s 
tattered prestige in the Middle East. As late as 1939 the complex and 
cumbersome nature of the British propaganda machine was still considered 
detrimental to the success of British efforts against the well-orchestrated 
Italian campaign. If lack of co-ordination between governmental 
 All 
this of course reduced the British government’s capacity to compete with 
the fast-growing state propaganda machines created by the Nazi, Soviet and 
Fascist regimes at a time when even the Treasury was unwilling to commit 
public money to propaganda activities overseas. 
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departments and clear directions from the centre had hindered progress in 
London, scarce communication with local authorities and population had 
grounded the take-off of British propaganda in Egypt, Palestine and the 
other mandated territories. The implementation of a comprehensive policy 
devised to safeguard British interests in the Near East had become a crucial 
issue. The measures until then adopted by the British government, 
especially in relation to propaganda, appeared unsatisfactory to those 
assessing political and strategic developments in the region: «The BBC 
Arabic Broadcasts are still an isolated effort which needs to be co-ordinated 
with other propaganda measures and the arrangements to do this are ad hoc 
instead of being permanent and defined in both London and the Middle 
East».53
     On the eve of the Second World War, therefore, despite military 
rearmament and the re-organisation of the structures responsible for 
overseas propaganda and intelligence, Britain was still considered 
unprepared to meet the challenge of Axis subversive activities in the 
Mediterranean and the Levant. The long-awaited shift in direction of 
overseas propaganda began in the mid-1930s through the creation of new 
institutions such as the British Council (1934), or the strengthening of 
existing ones like the BBC, in order to compete with the growing pressure 
brought by Italian and German activities in the Middle East. 
 
     If the nature of the challenge facing Britain’s strategic and economic 
interests in the Middle East was not immediately grasped by Foreign and 
Colonial Office civil servants in London, the perception afforded by British 
diplomats working in the region was far more realistic. Some of them, 
following the end of three years of upheaval in Palestine, called for a more 
vigorous propaganda offensive and the decentralisation of the British 
propaganda machine, with the establishment of a co-ordination bureau in 
Haifa. This was the result of increasing scepticism towards the 
effectiveness of the methods employed to project Britain’s military, 
security and trade interests overseas. In particular, the work of the BBC and 
its foreign language broadcasts came under scrutiny, as audiences in the 
Middle East seemed largely unimpressed by news and views that came 
from as far as the British isles and had, apparently, very little impact on 
their daily lives. The aloofness of British broadcasts, despite the various 
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correctives introduced to make them more appealing to local audiences, 
would, critics believed, play in the hands of Britain’s political opponents, 
not the propagandists of Radio Bari or officials of the Germany Foreign 
Ministry, but the more extreme fringes of the Arab nationalist movement.54
     Several strategic reviews of British propaganda in the Middle East were 
carried out throughout 1939. Some, at the Foreign Office, suggested that 
the Middle Eastern Section of the Foreign Publicity Department should 
strengthened and staffed with British personnel and foreign propaganda 
officers, who would be responsible for activities in crucial and sensitive 
areas such as Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Aden, where Italian intrigues were 
intensifying, but also Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the Persian Gulf. All 
this, at a cost of approximately £5000 for the first twelve months.
  
55 After 
much speculation, it was decided to approach the restructuring of British 
propaganda in the Middle East by creating a Central Bureau in London, 
which would be tasked with dealing with “wordy propaganda” only.56
     Towards the end of spring 1939, the Italian government complained 
vehemently about an increase in anti-Italian propaganda in the Middle East. 
The Italians emphasised that this wave of hostile activities masterminded 
by the British authorities in the region blatantly contravened the spirit and 
clauses of the 1938 Mediterranean Agreement that had called for a 
cessation of British and Italian propaganda in the Middle East. 
 The 
Middle East section would co-ordinate its work with that of the British 
Council and of news broadcasting agencies as well as regional consular 
offices and would also be linked through various government departments 
to the Cabinet.  This later review of British propaganda strategy belatedly 
acknowledged that the more insidious and venomous of anti-British 
activities in Arab countries had been orchestrated by indigenous forces that 
had not always relied on the support of Axis regimes. By the late 1930s, 
British officials seemed to become aware that the challenge to Britain’s 
imperial asset came from within and not outside the empire; nationalist 
movements had morphed into formidable political forces whose strength no 
longer depended on the support they received from Fascist Italy or Nazi 
Germany.   
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Furthermore, the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, remarked that 
British representatives in the Middle East, and especially in Iraq and Egypt, 
were exerting undue pressure on local governments. This, according to 
Ciano, resulted in a mounting hostility by governing institutions in Iraq and 
Egypt towards Italy and Italian interests, and led to the adoption of 
«unjustified measures against Italian nationals».57 The new and more 
resolute strategy adopted by the British authorities to contain the diffusion 
and negative impact of hostile propaganda in the Levant had produced 
some convincing results. In 1940 the Turkish government, supported by its 
British counterpart, banned the publication of news and newspapers that 
could contradict or undermine the country’s official position in relation to 
the European conflict. The Italian-inspired «Beyoglu» and the German 
«Turkische Post» were among the first newspapers suspended, while the 
Italian authorities lamented that «the Turkish press as a whole, already 
subservient to the democratic powers, has been reduced to a mere 
instrument of British propaganda».58
     By 1939, the British government had come a long way since the early 
days after the Great War when the entry “propaganda” had been deleted 
from the peacetime political dictionary and the successful propaganda 
machine had been dismantled on moral grounds. However, by the second 
half of the 1930s, the proliferation of Axis – and in particular Italian – 
activities in the Middle East had prompted British policy makers to reassess 
their political priorities and ethical preconceptions. Through its media 
corporation, the BBC, the British government joined its external 
competitors attempting to project and ultimately sell its image to a large 
overseas audience. In 1937, the BBC was asked to set up a broadcasting 
service in Arabic and, at the same time, to begin broadcasting in Spanish 
and Portuguese to Latin American countries. It was considered to be an 
adequate response after years of rampaging Italian propaganda in the 
Levant. 
 
     The intensification of German and Italian activities in the Middle East 
also called attention to the inadequacy of British counter-propaganda and 
counter-intelligence plans. The BBC Arabic broadcasts, the pinnacle of 
British propaganda in the region, were initially regarded by local listeners 
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as unsatisfactory and scarcely appealing. They aimed at a restricted 
intellectual circle, leaving out a large sector of Arab audience unable to 
fully appreciate the significance of some news bulletins, and even to follow 
most British broadcasts, as they coincided with time for prayers.59 
However, not only specific propaganda activities, but also the whole 
structure supporting Britain’s propaganda strategy in the Middle East had 
come under increasing criticism. The lack of a central co-ordinating 
authority was strongly emphasised, and the work of well-reputed agencies 
such as the British Council was subject to scrutiny. Some of the activities 
designed to match the Fascist regime’s zeal, for example in the field of 
cultural propaganda, were initiated after laborious discussions and hindered 
by inadequate funding and half-hearted commitment. The British Council 
funding allocation for Egyptian schools in 1937-38 is exemplary: the 
budget was shrunk despite the advertised increase, and access to non-
European students was further restricted in an area where a proactive policy 
of inclusion of Egyptian children should have been adopted.60
     However, towards the end of the 1930s, Britain’s belated propaganda 
offensive caught the Italians by surprise and generated a wave of 
indignation in the corridors of the Italian Foreign Ministry and Ministry of 
Popular Culture. With the consolidation of broadcasting services in foreign 
languages, Britain actively engaged its European competitors in a war of 
words which, as hostilities broke out, became integral part of the grand 
strategy of the war. The Italians were left to watch the developments and 
progression of the British propaganda machine and its role within the 
dynamics of the conflict. In March 1941, the BBC Director General 
Frederick Ogilvie confidently claimed that «[this] was the first war by 
radio, the first war where radio broadcasts played a significant role. 
Propaganda has become the fourth weapon, the radio a new instrument of 
technological warfare, which has profoundly affected military 
operations».
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 The Italians would soon complain that the «insidious British 
propaganda» not only succeeded in recruiting sympathisers overseas, but 
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was effectively undermining the morale of Italian troops, by emphasising 
the degree of support Britain still enjoyed in Italy, where the British 
services had created an efficient network of collaborators and informers.62
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although conscious of the limitations of their propaganda and intelligence 
structures and concerned about the hostile efforts of German and Italian 
agents in the Middle East, many in Britain were also confident that Italy’s 
and Germany’s aggressive campaigns in the Arab world had in the long-
term met with relatively little success.63 Slightly different was perhaps the 
assessment provided by diplomats and military personnel stationed in the 
region, who were weary of Italy’s attempts to exploit Britain’s weakening 
political and economic partnerships in the Middle East. On the eve of the 
outbreak of hostilities in Europe, the Italians became also aware of the slow 
decline of their popularity and, although blaming technical incidents and 
language difficulties, seemed to believe that Arab audience was gradually 
shifting towards «clear and, apparently, more interesting» British 
broadcasts.64
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 Despite the initial positive response, Italy’s contacts with 
sectors of the Arab nationalist leadership did not result in a long-lasting 
political alliance, as the real nature of Mussolini’s imperialistic ambitions 
soon became too apparent. Italy’s position in North Africa and the Levant 
did not benefit from the decline of Britain’s prestige in the Muslim world. 
Instead, following the ill-fated alliance with Germany, the fall of the Fascist 
regime and the disastrous economic consequences of the war, Italy’s 
ambitions to become a world power crumbled. On this matter, Arielli 
convincingly argues that lack of strategic foresight, coupled with financial 
constraints, the poor state of the Italian armed forces and scarce domestic 
support, undermined the Italian experiment at empire-building. Thus, after 
a period of intense activity between 1935 and 1938, «Mussolini and his 
63 See F. HINSLEY, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. I, London, HMSO, 
1990, pp. 23-24. 
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followers neglected to prepare the ground for a serious threat to Britain’s 
Middle Eastern position».65
     However, until then, Italian propaganda and subversive activities had 
generated concern and suspicion in London, although assessment remained 
somewhat contradictory and patchy. The strong inter-dependence between 
propaganda and foreign policy was underlined by the organisational 
structure of the Italian propaganda machine, where the synergy between the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Popular Culture allowed for 
an efficient division of responsibilities and transmission of information and 
instructions. Unlike its contemporary information and intelligence services 
– made of disparate and competing agencies – the Fascist propaganda 
machine succeeded in co-ordinating the activities and interaction of its 
diverse departments. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained in charge of 
providing general directives to propagandists in Italy and abroad, and 
ensured that Italian propaganda overseas constantly met the specific 
objectives of Italy’s foreign policy; it also provided logistic support through 
its official overseas representatives and the numerous Italian communities 
in North Africa. From 1937, in particular, the Ministry of Popular Culture 
was responsible for the operational aspects of propaganda, initiating and co-
ordinating various activities through its specialised sections dealing with 
press, publications, cinema and radio. Budgeting and funding of particular 
activities was a task often shared by the two Ministries. The Italians had 
allocated a substantial budget to both domestic and overseas propaganda, 
and in particular to publications promoting the civilising mission 
underlying Italy’s colonial endeavours.
 
66
     Although Axis encroachment in the British and French colonial world 
were often viewed with a degree of anxiety in London and Paris, the British 
government appeared to have significantly overlooked the set of political 
and social circumstances that had created throughout the Arab world an 
audience receptive to the allure of Axis propaganda. The growth and 
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strengthening of nationalist movements throughout the British empire had 
created a political counterpart that Britain seemed unable to acknowledge 
and deal with, thus resisting any substantial re-structuring of her 
commitments in the Middle Eastern region. Inter-departmental 
disagreements between Colonial Office and Foreign Office over the 
handling of Britain’s relations with independent Arab states and with the 
Arab nationalist movements hindered the formulation of a coherent and 
clear policy in the Middle East, while the fragmented and under-funded 
counter-intelligence service provided little valuable insight into the 
subversive strategy of Axis powers in British-controlled territories. Finally 
the late revival of the British First World War propaganda machine delayed 
the adoption of effective measures to curb the hostile activities of Italian 
propagandists. 

  
